



MARKET UPDATE

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Market Update – April 8, 2024

I. Last Week

A. Stocks

1. **Negative week:** DJIA -2.27%; **S&P 500 -.95%**; Nasdaq -.80%; IWM -2.78%
 - a. S&P outperforming Nasdaq since early February
 - b. US stocks have added \$9T in market cap since Oct. 2023
 - c. Divergence in big tech stocks could signal rally exhaustion
 - i. **Fab 4:** NVDA, META, MSFT, AMZN
 1. Double digit declines in AAPL and TSLA in 2024
 - a. GOOGL is in the middle
 2. Earnings growth of other 493 companies will outpace Magnificent Seven by Q4 ([WSJ](#)) ([Bloomberg](#)) ([FT](#))
2. **Market resilience**
 - a. Traders continue to buy the dips
 - b. S&P 500 remains above **50-day moving average** ([Barron's](#))
 - c. All S&P 500 sectors gained in Q1 (except real estate)
3. **Big stories** from the week:
 - a. Possibility of **delayed rate cuts** (~50% chance in June; 2.5 cuts in 2024)
 - i. Higher rates (**10-yr** highest since Nov.)
 1. Strong economy
 - a. Strong jobs report (discussed later)
 2. Sticky inflation (CPI report next week)
 - a. Higher oil prices
 - i. Geopolitical tensions (Syria and Iran accused Israel of a missile strike on an Iranian diplomatic building in Damascus)
 - b. **Fed speak** of delaying rate hikes
 - i. **Powell:** need greater confidence that we're headed to 2%, but recent data doesn't change the overall picture ([Federal Reserve](#))
 - ii. **Kashkari** floated idea of no rate cuts this year
 - iii. **Logan** spoke of **higher r*** (real neutral rate)
 1. Growing deficits, strong investment demand, potential productivity boom
 2. 5y5y TIPS real rate ~2%
 - iv. Logan also spoke of **immigration** (expanding employment): CBO 4MM more immigrants from 2021 – 2023 than prior estimate; 4.4MM from 2024 – 2026 than estimated ([Dallas Fed](#))
 - c. **Strong jobs report**
 - i. Powell said strong job growth in itself is not a reason to be concerned about inflation
 - d. **ISM manufacturing** moved into expansion for first time since Sep. 2022
4. **Gold rally**
 - a. Expectations of Fed rate cuts, demand from China, ETF flows, geopolitical uncertainty

B. Employment Report

1. Feb. **establishment survey** showed 2.7MM more jobs YoY. **Household survey** was approximately half of that. Difference is likely due to **population growth** estimate in household survey. Estimate is based on Census Bureau estimate of .5% growth. CBO thinks it's actually .9% because of immigration.
 - a. Suggests economy can grow more without overheating.
 - b. Maybe instead of 100K jobs being our speed limit per month (once we're at full employment), it's really 160K – 200K ([WSJ](#))
2. **March establishment survey: +303K jobs** (200K expected); prior two months +22K
 - a. **Wage growth +.3% MoM, +4.1% YoY** (lowest since June 2021)
 - b. Leisure and hospitality and private education and healthcare account for 1.5MM of the 2.9MM jobs gained in past year
3. **March household survey: 3.8% unemployment** (down from 3.9%)
 - a. Participation rate rose to 62.7% (first increase since November)
4. Strong job market gives Fed leeway to wait before cutting
5. Strange things we've seen over past year:
 - a. Continued job gains despite high rates
 - b. Cooling inflation without job losses ([WSJ](#)) ([Bloomberg](#))

C. Sticky Inflation

1. Inflation's decline from 2022 highs represents the easy gains. **Last mile** is tougher.
 - a. **Core PCE +3.5% annualized in three months** through Feb.
 - i. Challenges expectations of steady declines
 - b. Central banks expected "bumpy last mile"
2. **Factors contributing to stubborn inflation**
 - a. Resilient economic growth (real consumer spending ~5% annualized in Feb.)
 - b. Strong job creation and high wage growth (service inflation)
 - c. Central banks may be inadvertently adding to inflation pressure
 - i. Signaling pivot toward rate cuts pushed down borrowing costs and pushed up asset prices
3. **Factors favoring further inflation decline**
 - a. Surge of immigration (keeps lid on wage increases)
 - b. Increase in productivity (offsetting high wage growth)
 - i. Uncertain whether this will last
 - c. China boosting manufacturing capacity and exports amid slumping property market (lowering global goods inflation)
4. **Risks and challenges**
 - a. Oil prices have risen recently
 - b. If central banks react to stubborn inflation by backing away from rate cuts:
 - i. Pressure on heavily indebted governments and employers
 - ii. Test of central banks' will to finish last mile
 - c. Higher government spending on defense and green energy and geopolitical trade tensions...
 - i. May pressure central banks to tolerate higher inflation ([WSJ](#))

II. “How You Might Look at Recent Data,” Richmond Fed Pres. Tom Barkin, April 4th

A. Economic Update

1. **Finished 2023 strong** (contrary to most forecasts)
 - a. 12-month PCE inflation came all the way down to 2.6%
 - b. GDP 3.4% and unemployment near historic lows
 - i. Despite higher interest rates, global conflicts and banking turmoil
2. **Early 2024** has been a little **less encouraging**
 - a. PCE inflation has come in higher – first two months annualized: **4.3%**
 - b. Consumer spending softer: 1.3% annualized
3. There are arguments to underweight some of recent data (e.g., seasonal adjustments and winter weather), but it raises a question:
 - a. **Are we seeing a real shift in the economic data or just a bump along the way**

B. Different Ways to Look at the Numbers

1. **Soft-landing**
 - a. Extraordinary levels of post-pandemic spending have been normalizing
 - b. Post-Covid supply chain shortages have been largely resolved
 - c. Labor market pressures alleviated by rebound in prime-age labor force participation and recent high levels of immigration
 - i. Productivity increases have also helped
 1. Possibly from automation and AI
 - d. Most measures of inflation expectations have remained stable
 - i. Businesses and consumers see Fed’s actions and targets as credible
 - e. 12-month inflation at 2.5% and three-month job gains average 265K
2. **Demand pessimist**
 - a. Policy works with a lag
 - i. Recent increases in delinquencies
 - ii. Challenges in CRE
 - iii. Weakness in other interest-sensitive sectors – banking, residential real estate, manufacturing, home improvement
 - b. Maybe labor market is nearing a turning point
 - i. Nearly $\frac{3}{4}$ of last year’s job gains came from just three sectors: health care and social assistance, leisure and hospitality, and government
 - c. Risk of geopolitical shock
3. **Inflation pessimist**
 - a. Continued strong wage growth in a tight labor market
 - i. Atlanta Fed Wage Growth Tracker is still at 5% (Feb. 2020 was 3.7%)
 - b. Consumers’ continued willingness to spend (healthy personal balance sheets). Savings rate is 3.6% (was 7.7% pre-pandemic)
 - c. Macro-forces have turned inflationary
 - i. Deglobalization, limited housing supply, demographics, energy transition
4. **Fed pessimist** (most tightening cycles end poorly)
 - a. Fed will keep rates high for too long; or
 - b. Fed will normalize too quickly and allow inflation to linger

C. Barkin's View

1. Demand

- a. Not in a recession today, but all of this **tightening will eventually slow the economy further**
 - i. **Corporate interest payments** as a % of corporate revenues and **personal interest payments** as a % of disposable personal income have only now finally gotten back in the range of 2019 levels
 1. Suggests full impact of rates is yet to come
- b. If economy does cool, it **doesn't need to be as painful** as Great Recession
 - i. Could have **less dislocation in labor** market
 1. Employers hesitant to lay off workers
 - ii. A slowdown **shouldn't catch anyone by surprise** – planning for two years
 1. Already slowed hiring, streamlined costs, managed inventories, and deferred investment
 2. Banks have cut back on marginal credit

2. Inflation

- a. Price-setters are increasingly convinced that the era of **significant pricing power is behind them**
 - i. High inflation had given them the courage to raise prices
- b. Barkin is looking for **slowing in reported inflation to sustain and broaden**
 - i. Before pandemic, 26% of PCE basket had increased >3% YoY
 1. Today, it's 54%
 - ii. Much of the inflation drop so far has come from partial reversal of pandemic-era price increases on certain goods
 1. Inflation in both **shelter and services** remains higher than historical levels
- c. Risk is that as price decreases on goods normalize, continued shelter and services inflation will leave overall index higher than 2% target

3. Fed optimist (different than believing Fed is infallible)

- a. Optimistic that keeping **rates somewhat restrictive** can bring inflation back to target
- b. If economy does overheat (unexpected), Fed knows how to respond
 - i. If economy slows, Fed has enough firepower to support it
- c. It's smart for Fed to **take our time**
 - i. Risks to employment and inflation are moving into better balance
 - ii. Need greater confidence that inflation is moving sustainably to 2%
 1. No one wants inflation to reemerge
 2. Given a strong labor market, we have time for the clouds to clear before toggling rates down

III. Losing Faith in Education ([WSJ](#))

A. Lost Faith in Idea of “College for All”

1. **36%** of Americans have high confidence in higher ed; was **57%** ten years ago
2. Nearly half of parents prefer not to send child to four-year college after high school
3. **2/3** of high school students think they will be fine without a college degree
4. Percentage of high school graduates that enroll in college: **62%** (2022); 70% (2016)

B. Some of Problems We Face

1. Cost

- a. **Real cost** climbed **180%** between 1980 and 2020
 - i. State budget cuts, administrative bloat, campus amenities, signaling, Bennett Hypothesis (availability of loans)
- b. Bad results for entrants: 40% don't graduate; 20% chronically underemployed
 - i. Only 40% find a job that requires their degree
- c. Diluted signal from degree due to increase in graduates and weaker outcomes

2. Schools poorly run

- a. Departments protect turf and fail to adjust to labor market
 - i. Undersubscribed humanities classes; waiting lists for classes leading to jobs
- b. Accreditors approve programs that fail to produce financial value for graduates
- c. Broken corporate governance at schools

3. Problems with teaching

- a. Failure of schools to teach students critical thinking skills
- b. 1/4 of graduates lack basic numeracy skills; 1/5 lack basic literacy skills (per ETS)
- c. Faculty rewarded for research not teaching
- d. Grade inflation makes it difficult to hold students to high standards
- e. Course instructor surveys result in some faculty appeasing students
- f. Schools treating students as customers purchasing a credential

4. Problems with students

- a. Students spend half as much time studying as 1961 – have to work; other options
- b. Increase in cheating due to transactional attitude

5. Politics

- a. Politicization of education system by state governors
- b. Political intolerance on campus